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Abstract
This paper examines the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis as a diplomatic experience, conducted
mainly by the U.S. and U.S.S.R as an alternative to war. Both nations had nuclear weapons
capabilities that could rapidly transform a basically local conflict into total war. The potential
for disaster, plus other limiting factors, made a series of diplomatic encounters the only
productive option. The diplomatic course also shielded American and Russian interests not
directly related to the conflict. Each nation and its leader had pragmatic reasons for practicing
restraint. These included conservation of assets, political stability, and most importantly, the
dubious chances for sustainable gains. Limited war doctrine was influential in establishing
these policies.
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Introduction
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s 1958-59 proposals to deny Western access to
Berlin and revise the existing German settlement challenged the balance of power in Europe and
Western allied unity. The United States could not allow Khrushchev to unilaterally abrogate the
Potsdam occupation agreements without a serious erosion of American influence in Europe.1
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had to reconcile
longstanding policy goals, including the reunification of Germany, with the difficulties of
effectively using military force to assert Allied treaty rights in Berlin.
The Americans pragmatically pursued a diplomatic solution that consistently resisted
pressure from Allied and U.S. military leaders to exercise force. In the early stages of the
conflict, Dulles’ personal command of the situation neutralized military assertiveness. When
Dulles was replaced due to illness by Christian Herter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made a
more determined effort to extend their influence at a meeting in mid-March 1959. But
Eisenhower was not going to change course at a point when negotiations indicated a near-term
resolution to the crisis. At the same time, the President made it clear to the Soviets that the
United States would risk war if necessary. This restrained but tough course maintained the
viability of the status quo in Germany without destroying chances for an improved settlement. It
even provided some cautious hope for progress through renewed ministerial negotiations. The
United States was able to neutralize the Soviet threat without unacceptable retreat or actual
conflict.
This episode did not produce any major change in the status of Berlin or the two
Germanys. As such, it is often considered as just a prelude to the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961
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without the drama of the latter event. However, a tense diplomatic crisis with very real dangers
of nuclear combat in the wings did exist from November 1958 until to the Foreign Minister’s
Conference in May 1959. It started and ended over diplomatic tables, but there was a
background of military alert and public apprehension on both the American and Soviet sides.2
That readiness reflected Khrushchev’s six month deadline before the USSR would take unilateral
political action unacceptable to the West. Fortunately, actual military confrontations were few
and brief. The fact that military capabilities were not used did not lessen the danger that the
conflict might have escalated into general war.
This crisis, referred to here as “Berlin II”, is most often considered as a conflict arising
from the unresolved status of Germany, NATO disunity, nuclear tensions and superpower
hegemony in Europe. It was also a deliberate Soviet provocation of the U.S. beyond just the
European context. The United States had to deal with the Soviets in other regions of the world
and faced possible horizontal escalation in Asia and the Middle East, where the other Western
powers had little remaining interest.3
Thus, most of the US and Soviet activities in Berlin II were conducted at the diplomatic
level. Khrushchev’s November 28 proposal for a Western withdrawal from Berlin and a new
German settlement was a diplomatic challenge, not a military confrontation. 4 Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles went to Europe in December for consultations with America’s European
allies. From these meetings, the US, France, Britain and West Germany drafted communiqués
and delivered them to the Soviets at year’s end.5 Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited
Washington in January to present a more belligerent and impatient reply, including a draft
German peace treaty. 6 In response, the ailing Dulles made a final trip to Europe in February to
restore some Allied coherence.7 However, Prime Minister Sir Harold Macmillan’s subsequent
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solo venture to Moscow8 and other differences during March9 skewed these gains to some
degree.
Dulles’s cautions to French President Charles DeGaulle and West German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer for coolness and flexibility strained Allied relations. But his patience also
established a framework for his replacement, Acting Secretary Christian Herter, to build upon.
Direct diplomatic contact continued between the US and USSR throughout the spring of 1959,
including further tough hints from the Soviets about their own nuclear resolve.10 The worst was
over by then. By late April, tensions with the East and among the allies dissipated in the
preparations for Foreign Minister’s Conference between the US, the USSR, Britain, France, and
Germany.11 These talks also provided some opportunity for one of Khrushchev’s key aims, high
level bilateral talks with the U.S., involving “some questions worthy of examination.”12
Such a brief summary of the November 1958 to May 1959 diplomatic events does not
challenge conventional interpretations. We have to closely examine the original material on
which the interpretations are based. The archival records and relevant historiography covering
this Cold War diplomatic crisis reveal consistent evidence of bureaucratic conflict between the
U.S. Defense and State Departments. Reports of the often awkward Western planning efforts for
possible airlift and convoy operations show the difficulty of coordinating military action with the
Allies.13 Confusion and uncertainty over the effectiveness of force were principal reasons for
choosing negotiations. Another reason was the essentially diplomatic foundation of the original
1945 agreements on Berlin. The Allied powers, in fact, made adherence to these agreements the
cornerstone of their resistance and consistently referred to them in most communiqués and
discussions among themselves.14
In addition, the record provides copious examples of Dulles’s emphasis on considering
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force during Berlin II as an option of last resort. The evidence contradicts the image of Dulles as
a “brinksman” who aggravated tensions on all sides in Berlin II. Instead, he enforced a general
discipline of diplomatic and military restraint. This was likely a pragmatic as much as a
philosophical attitude, as though his calculated reasoning and reference points had told him this
was the only practical option.15 That discipline, of course, carried the ultimate authority of the
President. Eisenhower succeeded at an important level in making the Soviet Premier wait at
arms length another several months before getting his summit meeting. He used the seasoned
coolness of Dulles and his deputies to ensure that there was a low risk of war. He did not want
closer encounters with Khrushchev until the Soviet attitudes improved.
The most complete information in Berlin II comes from diplomatic rather than military
documents. Still the fact that this is not a subject of open military history attests to diplomacy’s
determining role in the crisis. Reconstructing the Berlin II events from the diplomatic record
should test my revisionist contentions. These records cover the options outlined and policies set
at Eisenhower’s direction in Washington and then transmitted by Dulles and his successor-intraining, Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter. Because Dulles took these policy decisions
personally to Europe, the record also includes pivotal interactions with Allied leaders as well as
their diplomats.
In daily practice over Berlin II’s six-month duration, the U.S. Embassy desks in Bonn,
Moscow, London and Paris had to handle most ofm the contact and negotiations with allies and
opponents. The American ambassadors in Europe’s key capitols provided Eisenhower’s key
intelligence on the crisis. They bore much of the worst of the Soviet efforts at intimidation.
Their dependable communications were invaluable to Dulles and to Eisenhower, and may even
provide more authentic reflections of Berlin II than the better known formalized sessions of the
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National Security Council (NSC).
The field cables, along with the policy planning staff records, NSC position papers, and
miscellaneous letters and the like, can help us see why this was “a war that wasn’t”. It could
have easily been otherwise had hotter heads prevailed. A reconstruction from November to May
shows not only the signal points of restraint and the pressures that indicated caution, but also the
efforts at compromise and constructive negotiations, not to enforce a Western-style reunification
of Germany, but to maintain the relative peace Berlin had enjoyed for ten years. To begin this
reconstruction, it is useful to look at the political situation in Berlin before Khrushchev’s
November proposal and at trends in American and Soviet strategic doctrine.

Background to the Second Berlin Crisis
Actual military confrontations leading to this period began with a rash of US-East
German confrontations at Berlin inter-zonal checkpoints in August and September over
inspection issues. These were minor but messy. On September 13, the East Germans detained a
British Soldier at Helmstedt checkpoint, then transferred him to a Soviet car for delivery to
Marienborn. There, he was released at the British checkpoint.16 A West German man was beaten
by the East Germans when he attempted to return to the U.S. sector at Dresdener Strasse
crossing. An East German crowd gathered and interceded on the man’s behalf to help him
escape; he took an East German truncheon with him but returned it, although the volkspoleizei
refused to return the man’s identification papers.17 The continued exodus of East Germans
through Berlin to the Western sectors and resettlement outside of the Communist domain caused
a growing friction.18 The loss of so many professional and skilled workers annoyed the East
Germans, who started taking their frustrations out on hapless American soldiers. Khrushchev
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recalled in his memoirs, “The resulting drain of workers was creating a simply disastrous
situation.” He added, “If things had continued much longer like this, I don’t know what would
have happened.”19
There was also a new element of tension due to the early 1958 deployments in both East
and West Germany of theater range nuclear-tipped missiles. Inadvertent use of these weapons
could escalate to the use of intercontinental nuclear weapons both nations were developing. An
April protest by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko over U.S. U-2 overflights was an early
indicator of Soviet jumpiness over the chance of accidental war. 20
These pre-November access incidents are rarely emphasized in the historiography or even
in the State Department collection, Foreign Relations of the United States. Yet, they were taken
very seriously by the US mission in Bonn and in Washington. These incidents almost
exclusively involved US personnel. While worrisome, they still did not directly suggest an
imminent regional conflict. In fact, just a few weeks before the crisis, the NSC had approved a
new master policy statement, for West Germany, Berlin, and East Germany. It did not anticipate
any near-term change in Berlin’s status quo. 21 NSC 5803 reflected no change in inter-German
relations. It put the blame for reunification’s stalled progress firmly at the Soviet door and
expressed concern over the alternative concept of confederation. The report touted Berlin’s
economic recovery and downplayed Communist provocations as diversions to aid East German
morale and Walter Ulbricht’s power. NSC 5803 did not anticipate active, imminent conflict over
Berlin. Only two active-response strategic options were discussed: nuclear deterrence and smallscale conventional war. Soviet efforts to transfer occupational authority to the GDR were
dismissed as a propaganda effort more than a diplomatic problem. 22
Even though Germany did not loom as an expected theater of war in mid-1958, Dulles
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had already been studying concepts of limited war with nuclear weapons. A July 3, 1957 memo
from State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) director Gerard Smith to his PPS colleague
Elgon Matthews noted that Secretary Dulles was impatient with Defense limited-war papers.
Dulles thought “military matters should be an instrument of political policy and not vice versa.”
Smith also thought the Secretary’s thinking was becoming “more fluid”, seen in his disagreement
with the military doctrine that limited war capacity varied directly with total war capacity.23
These memo records may refer to the “The Philosophy of Limited War”, a brief for a meeting of
State’s Army Policy Council dated 9 October, 1957. This paper is notable for its references to
the influence of private strategists Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger, and because of the way
it defines the terms limited war: “one in which…one or more restrictions applies in some
degree”. 24
Despite his own earlier hawkishness, Dulles had become impatient with those who
refused to consider the inherent limits of particular conflicts. Germany was such a case. Dulles
was becoming increasingly aware that the threat of war was often more constraining than
anticipated. He had little confidence in the feasibility of limiting nuclear combat. The new
private strategists like Kissinger chided Dulles’ overreliance on massive assured destruction.25
But he was skeptical of their optimistic scenarios of using tactical nuclear force. He understood
how rapidly a local war could spark a general war. The Eisenhower administration had already
avoided intervention in several limited wars, notably in Suez and Hungary in 1956.
Private debate over defense force structure and spending, such as the ideas emanating
from the Council for Foreign Relations and the Gaither Committee’s panel on limited war, did
have some influence on American strategic policy. America’s ability to project force remained a
topic of much discussion. By the next year’s Fourth of July, 1958, Smith and Matthews were
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preparing yet another updated set of limited war acts options, this time explicitly incorporating
nuclear capabilities. Days before, Defense officials had optimistically estimated that limited
nuclear exchanges would last no more than 30-60 days.26 But under questioning, they admitted
that these estimates had not been based on the certain probability of in-kind retaliation. Their
estimates were too limited to be practical.
Speculations and scenarios about possible small wars were still largely theoretical in
1958 though. Limited wars seemed more likely in post-colonial hostile situations. The U.S. did
not yet have any large scale voluntary involvements in post- colonial regions, such as Indochina.
Deployments in response to unexpected provocation were the exception rather than the rule. The
few military interventions Eisenhower had approved were intended to be demonstrations of
surgical precision, like the deployment of the U.S. Army and Marines to Lebanon. Laos was
beginning to loom as a possible new theater of combat, but Germany seemed an improbable
battleground.

The Russian Challenge (November 1958)
Several incidents in September involving inspections at border checkpoints may have
forecasted increased hostilities over Berlin. These were apparently instigated by the East
German volkspolizei with a least tacit Soviet approval. A message from Ambassador David
Bruce to Dulles on September 2 details a proposed note, planned in conjunction with the British
and French, to the Soviets, “bring to your attention serious situation concerning life in this
city…(re) measures now being imposed” by permitting them, the Soviet authorities are
deepening the division of Germany.”27 The same day, an American soldier had his camera taken
at an inspection point by the vopos. He struck back at a vopo who then, in pursuit of the soldier
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crossed the checkpoint barrier into the West. When told by the West Germans that he was now
on their territory, the East German fled back across the border with the American’s camera.28
Further tripartite meeting summaries reveal that such harassment had become an ongoing
problem. British Foreign Service counselor Peter Wilkinson observed, “unless we were
prepared to submit to Soviet inspection procedures, we will probably be blockading ourselves in
Berlin.”29 At a meeting with acting Soviet political advisor Shilov two days later, the U.S.
embassy’s legal counselor Bernard Gufler “emphasized increasing brutality of Soviet sector
police.” Shilov replied that, “this was a matter entirely outside Soviet competence”. He then
cited a similar incident the previous month as evidence of the Soviet distancing themselves from
responsibility for security in Berlin. When the US advisor inquired whether Shilov’s statement
constituted definite unilateral abrogation of Soviet obligation to protect members Western allied
forces while in East Berlin, Shilov answered affirmatively. He said he “could not use influence
to return camera, matter out of his control.” 30 A few days later in quadripartite
(US/Britain/France/FRG) meetings the chairman, West Germany’s Dr. Northe stated that the
“Germans were impressed with apparent confusion in GDR circles on East German prerogatives
re controlling passage into East German enclave.” 31 There may have been a slight breakdown
between responsible East German and Soviet diplomatic and military authorities. The
provocations were mainly against Allied military personnel. But there was no clear chain of
command for the West to address. The situation had neither a ready military nor diplomatic
remedy.
At this point, Dulles sent the Bonn mission an excerpt from his September 9 news
conference, which he directed to be forwarded to West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt. Brandt
queried Dulles: “Mr. Secretary, is it a fair understanding that …you and the President regarded
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the threat of aggression in Quemoy and Matsu equal to the threat to the Western World in Berlin
and…are we again prepared to resist aggression?” Dulles replied: “…the two situations are
comparable…Perhaps Berlin is another example of a forward position which…could not be lost
in the face of a frontal attack without consequences which were unacceptable.32 His comments
may not have been directly related to these developments but the cable record shows he was
informed about the checkpoint incidents, and his message may have been a signal that the State
Department would not allow provocations to go unchallenged.
Unfortunately, the situation did continue to deteriorate at the local level, chiefly because
of East German efforts during August and September 1958 to incorporate the neighborhood of
Steinstuecken into their jurisdiction. This de facto redrawing of the deeply entrenched Potsdamauthorized borders was a serious concern in its own right, magnified because of the unstable
inspection and checkpoint climate. In a message of concern from the embassy to Dulles and
other missions and military installations, Bruce specifically emphasized that, “approval for the
use of armed forces must emanate from the highest level of the US government.” He also noted
that “the time required to obtain this authority after an act of aggression would preclude effective
and timely reaction on the part of the US in Steinestucken.” Despite the dilemma of needing to
be able to ‘take immediate action with…deliberate violations,” he stated forcefully that “repeat
not think it essential USCOB be given prior and unconditional authority to undertake military
action…” He concluded pessimistically that “one constant factor is that there is no REPEAT no
stable modus vivendi in Berlin…only proposal might improve situation would be (if) generally
known that if incursion took place US armed force would be used to restore situation.” Bruce
concluded, “for all practical purposes, our position is not such we can improve it fundamentally
from military standpoint. …situation hardly conducive to that.” 33 However, over some
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objections from both Allies and the JCS, Dulles would only consider possibly conducting a light
“garrison” airlift of essential military and diplomatic personnel and materiel.
A more serious interruption took place on October 8 at Marienborn checkpoint when
Soviet, not East German, guards detained a large US truck and its driver. Bernard Gufler
protested to the new Soviet political advisor Colonel Dimitri Markushkin. Markushkin’s
frequent cooperation with Bruce was generally a great asset to both sides all through Berlin II.
Though Markushkin could also be unhelpful when his superiors so directed, he helped in this
case. The truck was released the same day. The Steinestuecken dispute continued to occupy
much of the US mission’s attention particularly from October 22 to 28. 34
On November 23, Ambassador David Bruce issued general instructions that no inspection
challenges, unauthorized convoys, or retaliations of any kind were to be attempted by US
personnel. He concluded with this sobering caution: “any course of action designed to maintain
freedom of Berlin will finally depend upon our determination, if necessary to use force.”35
Fortunately, the tensions in Berlin had generally been tolerable enough that diplomats and
soldiers alike were able to retain discipline. There were other factors encouraging diplomatic
resolution, not least of which was that the Soviets were already floating revisionist
interpretations about alleged military guarantees of occupational jurisdiction. This provided the
West with grounds for delay and request for clarification. The tension was real enough for both
sides to welcome the postponements of diplomatic protocol instead of expensive battles. There
were plenty of reasons not to ruin Germany again so soon.
Contingency planning for armed combat over Berlin and along the inter-German borders
was challenging for both the US and USSR. Restrictions included the necessity to limit
collateral damage to civilians, economic assets, and infrastructure. Both sides may have been

11

reluctant to expend men and resources on a general scale. A confined war zone could nullify
many force advantages. Still, the USSR’s in situ advantages in conventional war assets were
well understood and discouraging.36 The Americans would be limited by their inability to match
and mobilize conventional assets into the region quickly. Military targets for all parties would
have to be selective to avoid alienating the population into riots which could spread abroad. The
Soviets had had an awkward time in both Poland and in Hungary in 1956. Their relations with
the East Germans had been strained ever since 1953. Consultations with European allies in the
days after Khrushchev’s November 10 preview speech, reported from the Moscow Sports
Palace, indicated wide divergence of opinion about practical options.37 The conflicts and
tensions in the Allied camp continued over the next six months. These proved nearly as
destabilizing as Khrushchev’s bold ultimata. If another of Khrushchev’s aims, besides summit
talks with the U.S., was to sow dissension among the American, French, British and West
Germans, he succeeded royally. Allied unity was a greater priority for the United States than a
war to affect German reunification
What were Khrushchev’s other aims, besides discord and a summit, and would they limit
his tactics? Not even his fellow Russians knew.38 Certainly he did not want a a total war, and
probably not even limited war. He had not been pleased with the few limited war situations the
Soviet had gotten embroiled in on his watch. Like Eisenhower, he had trimmed conventional
bases and forces and even moderated heavy arms purchasing. But, he also needed to preserve a
conventional strike capability and to keep cost and deterrence manageable.39 The Soviet force
in East Germany had to include theater nuclear weapons requested by Ulbricht. In the near term,
he also needed to mollify Ulbricht, who was losing control over Berlin as thousands of educated
workers fled west. German unification had essentially been a moot question since the
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establishment of the German Democratic Republic and Warsaw Pact and the growing viability of
West Germany as a renewed commercial and political power. A divided Germany was
dissatisfying but it was sustainable.
Khrushchev’s surprise proposals new German settlement, particularly regarding Berlin,
may not have been realistic, but they did have political advantages. Ulbricht’s complaints about
the drain of human resources from Berlin to the West had to be addressed.40 And, Berlin was the
one place where Russia and the Western Powers were all still in close contact.
By focusing his challenge there, Khrushchev could also advance several domestic and
Communist-sphere aims, including intimidating the new Politburo.41 In challenging the Potsdam
agreement, he could challenge the final European judgment of the War, while vaguely seeming
to be trying to restore German peace. Berlin was increasingly viewed by both the Americans and
Russians as symbolic but dysfunctional. Eisenhower called it “a mere relic of history.” It was a
safe target for political provocation. Berlin would be especially attractive if it could be acquired
without any danger to the Cold War landscape. He hoped it might be worth a U.S.-U.S.S.R.
summit meeting to Eisenhower as ransom for continued access. Culturally sensitive and
functionally superfluous, it could be demanded without disrupting more essential commerce and
contact. The Warsaw Pact countries could be brought forth as diplomatic partners. Khrushchev
must have known that Eastern European interlocutions would especially discomfit the West
European allies, who had tried to avoid East European initiatives like the Polish Rapacki plan.42
The new Moscow Politburo, finally purged of most of his rivals and old-line Stalinists
and now generally ignored, was astounded, bewildered, and inertly angry.43 Premier
Khrushchev’s impulsiveness had gone beyond the internal Russian upset of de-Stalinization to a
whole new level of international mischief that might be dangerously unsustainable. But he did
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have control over his foreign policy apparatus. Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan and Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko executed his policy with determination and little disagreement.44
The grand sweep of the whole ambition as well as its tough language was also seen as a
challenge to Red China’s Chairman Mao Tse Tung. His Chinese rival had recently tested the
Western presence in the Far East and otherwise liked to taunt Khrushchev. Soviet era historian
Roy Medvedev reflects a common impression in Russia that Mao’s offshore island attacks were
really aimed at Moscow as much as they were at Washington.45 Post-Soviet Russian historians
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, who stress the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Khrushchev’s
decision making, have pointed out that Ulbricht had heard Dulles’ recent comparisons the
Chinese offshore island situation with Berlin In October 1958, possibly to goad Khrushchev,
Ulbricht suggested the next issue of superpower contention might be Berlin’s status. 46
For the Americans, President Eisenhower was indeed dubious over Berlin’s strategic
value and not at all inclined to summitry with Khrushchev.47 He regarded the previous summit
of 1955 as a failure. Though this was the first post-war U.S. –U.S.S.R summit, it had not been
productive. He remained bitter over Khrushchev’s subsequent abrogation of summit promises in
both Poland and Hungary, as well as his interference in the Suez crisis.48 Eisenhower believed in
executive authority but also delegation of command. His “New Look” policy aimed to replace
expensive “containment” strategy with a leaner, more responsive defense capacity. He wanted to
eliminate costly self-perpetuating bureaucracies and force redundancies. He was disinclined to
wholesale weapons system purchases premised on suspect intelligence.49
This economical approach to maintaining sufficient defense assets demanded a flexible
foreign policy that looked to negotiation in crisis situations. To avoid such interventions, a
reliably subordinate security establishment was required. Stephen Ambrose has described the
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President as an advocate for military caution and limits. More recent examinations of
Eisenhower strategic policy such as Bowie and Immerman’s Waging Peace have further argued
that the “Ike” White House was systematically inclined to restraint and prudence. The President
was averse to military risk-taking and committed U.S. forces carefully, if at all. 50
Eisenhower did not regard the State and Defense Departments as rivals but rather as
equally subordinate institutions. Bureaucratization - whether at State or Defense - added a
deadly inertia and drag on decision making. 51 That could slow presidential authority unless an
expediter like Dulles could whip and cajole Washington’s security fiefdoms into cooperation.
By 1958, Eisenhower had the advantage of a sound grasp of Dulles’ basic geopolitical
instincts. After earlier heated experiences and disagreements, they were well seasoned and
understood each other.52 Their instincts about the Berlin situation were very similar. Both men
thought this was an indirect maneuver by Khrushchev, who had forecast and loudly proclaimed
his moves. The Kremlin leader established an extended timeline of six months, instead of simply
occupying all of Berlin as a fait accompli. But Eisenhower was also under considerable political
pressure from Congressional leaders wanting a more aggressive U.S. reaction. Their martial
allies such as columnist Joseph Alsop and strategist Walter Rostow advocated action.53
Khrushchev didn’t have to worry much about columnists or disgruntled maverick allies,
notwithstanding Ulbricht’s nagging or wayward Yugoslav Marshal Tito’s taunts. The
Washington and Western European newspapers were able to use the symbolic cause of Berlin
and endangered allies as leverage to shape public pressure for a hard military response.
Eisenhower’s relations with his principal European allies were already somewhat formal and
cold. The French and British remained particularly distant over his surprising lack of support for
Suez and their other failed colonial ventures.54
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While DeGaulle and Macmillan actively involved themselves in the negotiations,
Eisenhower, with confidence, delegated much of the US response to John Foster Dulles. As
Secretary of State from Eisenhower’s inauguration till his death from cancer in May 1959,
Dulles enjoyed considerable leeway in carrying out policy yet could faithfully execute
presidential directives. His opinion was valued, though he had had disagreements with
Eisenhower over Suez and Hungary. By 1958 his views were becoming congruent with the
President’s.55 At least in the preserved diplomatic record, there is little indication of divergence
or disagreement between the President and Secretary over the U.S. response to Khrushchev’s
proposals for a new German settlement.
Another reason for the executive branch’s preference for diplomatic resolution was
conflict between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Neil
McElroy was a weak partner of the Chiefs more than he was a forceful leader like Dulles.
McElroy could not lobby for his Department or for the JCS as effectively Dulles did for the State
Department.56 The State Department’s “Militarization of Foreign Policy” noted the Defense
Department’s divergent security goals and resistance to Eisenhower’s “New Look” drawdown
and streamlining of American defense positions.57 That growing conflict between the State
Department and the Joint Chiefs (and disagreements between the various Chiefs themselves)
represented an unacceptable threat to presidential control over negotiations. The diplomatic
table, not Berlin and Germany, had to serve as the field of battle, with the nuclear backup kept
both ready and contained.
Though the U.S. and U.S.S.R. ultimately achieved some political resolution without
escalation to general conflict. This coldest of Cold War conflicts had to be conducted at the
diplomatic level because the operating limits and resultant options for both sides were so
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restrictive.58 Military confrontations consisted of only a few East German and Soviet detentions
of U.S. soldiers and vehicles over inspection rights.59 These were usually resolved through the
Soviet political aide Dmitri Markushkin.
One indication of differences between State and Defense in the initial reaction period
came from Undersecretary of State Livingston Merchant. He wrote concerning an interruption
on November 14, 1958 of an American military convoy at the Soviet checkpoint “Babelsberg”
in Berlin. Merchant noted that such harassment had become chronic. Merchant stressed that the
Bonn mission and the Department agreed that “this is the wrong time, place, and issue on which
to resort to force.” 60 But he discouraged plans for a full scale airlift as too visible a military
commitment. He did mention again the possibility for a light garrison airlift.
He summarized topics of a meeting with the JCS as: Soviet determination to inspect
American trucks; allied reluctance to actually use force, prospects for further allied disunity, and
efforts to restore unity. The considerable Soviet surface advantages were discussed as well as the
“awkward” American staging environment. Merchant added that the JCS were firmly against a
new airlift but also committed to defense of convoys by force: “The JCS are following two lines
of thinking that cause us considerable concern.”61 The Merchant memo shows the rough frontier
between military and diplomatic positions in Washington.
In Berlin, State Department staffers Finlay Burns and Bernard Gufler were seriously
pursuing the “little airlift” option which appealed to the allies as well. This is significant because
it shows the diplomatic corps taking the leadership regarding the degree of force to be used. It
was remarked at the time that detentions were almost always targeted against the Americans and
with full Soviet oversight.62 It also seemed as though the Soviet military and diplomatic groups
were not always in full communication.
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Khrushchev cast his November 10 and 28 proposals as a timetable for Berlin to
become a demilitarized “free city.”63 It was a surprise move, even given the hostilities over
Steinestuecken. A useful example of the Soviet’s calculated retrenchment into seemingly
reasonable proposals that would prove onerous to the West was the improbable “Free City”
concept, which Khrushchev claimed as his own innovation.64 The “Free City” idea vaguely
evoked the peaceful transition Vienna had made from an occupied city to a neutral capital. In
Vienna, however, the Soviets had really had little reason to continue their occupation. In Berlin
they were naturally dominant, and easily able to maintain nearly four times as many troops as the
Americans had.
The real significance of his “free city” proposal may have been its non-military format,
delivered as a diplomatic message. The Soviets probably expected to be replied to in the same
way. Here were no lightning thrusts such as the Soviets had done in Hungary, or their Egyptian
clients had at Suez. This was a long-course diplomatic challenge, yet with a potential nuclear
warning. This diplomatic course was likely chosen because it was less hazardous or expensive
than military options. As Khrushchev told his son Sergei after the second speech, “No one
would start a war over Berlin…if negotiations don’t work, something will turn up.”65

The US & Allied Response (December 1958)
In December, Gerard Smith summarized a briefing led by Defense Secretary McElroy as
an indication that “in the immediate future the U.S. military capacity for meeting limited
aggression would rapidly decline.” Smith added that it was “likely be number of situations in
which a strong foreign policy position will be difficult to maintain…” He stressed the “necessity
for strengthening our limited war capabilities”.66 To avoid accidental escalation into total war
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and still pursue their respective interests, both sides confined their challenges to official notes
and speeches. They resisted more than token military activity. But in November and December,
it was still unclear whether or not the crisis could be contained diplomatically.
This meant containment of destabilizing military activity. In mid-December, retired
General Lucius Clay, who as CINCEUR in 1949, had masterminded the original Berlin airlift,
promoted the idea of an armed convoy from West Germany to Berlin.67 This option was
endorsed by the French and West Germans but was directly overruled by Dulles, who was
relaying the President’s wishes.68 Eisenhower had no intention of conducting another full scale
airlift. This would have likely only provoked Khrushchev to take more forceful measures. By
preserving the status quo as much as possible, Khrushchev’s challenge was diminished. He
would then have trouble credibly accomplishing his indirect aims at Peking and Washington.
Throughout, the basic centrality of Germany to the crisis was more in German eyes, East
and West, than to the other allied nations. France and Britain considered Khrushchev’s proposal
a challenge to them as much as to the Germans. A unified Germany would diminish their place
in the new European system. Not that Berliners were particularly pleased with the status quo. As
the West German Interior Minister Joachim Lipschutz emphatically told the American military
journal Combat in December, the Germans were open to a new political situation but not under
Soviet ultimatum.69 To the Soviets, their role as victors over Germany and guarantors of the
European settlement was a cornerstone of their international stature. They still considered
Berlin, Potsdam notwithstanding, as their rightful prize. However, both the East and West
German government governments had eagerly sought and received the first installations of
theater range nuclear missiles.70 The rearmament of Germany prompted the Soviets to confirm
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their leadership – and maybe even protect their western flank - by calling for demilitarization in
Berlin and later for all of Germany.
Soviet primacy in German occupation matters had to be reasserted against the new
nuclear backdrop. Soviet military doctrine had come to regard nuclear weaponry as
indispensable for the time being. But their leadership was beginning to acknowledge its risks.71
Tactical nuclear missile deployment was still controversial in America and in the Soviet Union.
Advocacy of tactical nuclear weapons deployment had to be considered alongside arguments
against America placing its main reliance on the unpredictable nuclear strategies. The latter
“examined the political costs of initiating the use of nuclear options and have found them very
substantial.”72 Unwilling to encourage military proposals for Berlin, Dulles turned down
General Lucius Clay’s request for an interview before his departure for a mid-December NATO
Foreign Minister meeting. 73 Acting Secretary Herter’s brief from Washington in advance of the
Dulles trip did provide some window for possible military action. Herter observed that “Soviets
and East Germans should not be allowed to entertain doubts as to our determination to use
limited force if need be…” He emphasized that the “purpose of (such) resort to is…test Soviet
intentions”74
Ambassador David Bruce had recently reported that even amidst Adenauer’s resolve to
“take a firm position,” other extenuating factors needed to be evaluated first. These included the
possibility that Khrushchev was trying to deflect attention from internal difficulties in Russia as
well as trying to impress the upcoming All Party Conference. Adenauer also suggested that
Khrushchev was acting out of frustration at West German influence with DeGaulle in the wake
of disappointment about unaccepted Soviet advances to DeGaulle since the previous May.75
Adenauer and Lipschutz had little to say about how firmness would translate to force projections
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or defensive positions.
Unsatisfactory practical applications of conventional power were often based on naively
assumptions. Military plans for political goals often underestimated predictable problems.
Eisenhower was determined to avoid being ensnared in a dangerous quagmire over dubious
territory. The President had deep reservations about Berlin’s worth. He told Dulles: “This was
another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions which are
wholly illogical”.76 At the NATO conference, Dulles basically laid down the law: The United
States would not support unauthorized military ventures or even full scale planning or
deployment and they would consider Khrushchev’s proposals at face value. Eisenhower and
Dulles both thought that the Soviet leader’s own positions could be used against him.
Dulles willingness to discuss compromises with the Soviets disturbed the Allies,
particularly DeGaulle .77 This resistance did not prevent communiqués from NATO on
December 15 and 18th. The final communiqué asserted resolve “not to yield to threats.” The
Allies also indicated they too sought a ‘solution to seek just settlements of the German
problem…” This would include “European Security arrangements… (and)…controlled
disarmament. 78 The US cover statement left no doubt that Dulles was acting at Eisenhower’s
direction; “The President reiterated our ... firm purpose” as a Four Power guarantor of Berlin’s
freedom.79 After these communiqués, though there was a period of apparent relaxation, with
some hints from Soviet aides that there was not likely to be any war over Berlin.

A Hard Soviet Reply and Strains on Allied Restraint (January-February 1959)
In January, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Washington, ostensibly on vacation
and to renew trade discussions . On January 10, he delivered a more forceful reply than the
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Americans probably expected. He presented an expanded version of the November proposals
that now included calls for a possible demilitarized unified German settlement. He made it clear
to Dulles that the Soviets had problems with the U.S. in non-German matters, particularly the
possible U.S. bases being planned for Turkey and Iran.80 In private talks with the President the
next day, Mikoyan was particularly strident on the subject of West German nuclear
deployment.81 But the Americans simply asked Mikoyan in return if the Soviets were really
ready for open elctions in Germany. They received no direct answer from Mikoyan, who simply
repeated the official concerns about nuclear encirclement and intent to resist such containment.
Whether that was the Soviets’ main worry or not, the issue of Western nuclear threat
made a useful cover for other issues between the Americans and the Russians. The Soviets’
expansion of the problem from Berlin to Germany as a whole renewed the confusion among the
allies. The U.S. had trouble in getting them to develop a coordinated practical response beyond
simple public declarations of firmness.
Although nearly too ill to travel from his worsening cancer, Dulles nevertheless returned
to Europe for consultations with the other foreign ministers. However, almost as soon as he
arrived, another serious incident occurred, involving a more extended detention. This again
required Markushkin’s assistance after direct entreaties to Soviet Commander Shilov were
ignored. The incident also revealed some dissonance between the Soviet military and political
authorities in Berlin. On February 2, the Soviets detained an American truck convoy on the
autobahn, which allegedly refused inspection. The complaint was somewhat dubious since the
rear of the trucks was open and the contents - jeeps – were plainly visible. The British also
suffered a detention the next day.82 In each case, the soldiers were not detained but the vehicles
were, suggesting a nuanced attempt at deliberate provocation. Bruce wired Dulles that “this is an
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obvious move to force inspection rights”83 In his next-day follow-up, he noted that “we either
submit to any inspection demand or resort to self-imposed blockade”.84
This was the most serious actual military contact of Berlin II and luckily –or perhaps by
design – it did not occur at a point where armed hostilities were likely to flare up. Inspection
checkpoints are defensive more than forward positions. The US vehicles were minimally armed.
The detention is conspicuously marginal in even the most references and summaries regarding
Berlin II, but it was of serious concern at the time to the US and British embassies. The French
offered to run some trucks through instead. Although Bruce considered the suggestion “worth
considering,” it was not followed up on. Perhaps they were concerned about escalating the
incident. As brinksmanship goes, it was not a particularly saber-rattling moment. General Lewis
Norstad, US NATO commandant, presented a plan for five light tanks to test the checkpoint.
This would be followed by a reinforcement battalion of light infantry.
But this escalatory idea was deferred in favor of Bruce’s appeal to Markushin. Bruce and
Markushin visited the site, and after Bruce demonstrated that only a jeep was being transported,
Markushin replied: “It is cold. I will not detain you further…” He added, “you and I are not able
to settle the issues involved. It must be taken to a higher level.” 85 Markushin also let him know
the release was a personal favor. The inspection issue was still open.
Coincidentally, a February 5, PPS memo says that a precedent of U.S. restraint
established in the Quemoy/Matsu incidents was being continued in the current German situation.
This memo also outlines State’s general strategy of taking the Soviets’ own proposals, such as
free elections, to the table at a foreign minister’s conference. There they could see if these were
bluffs or not. The guess was that Ulbricht actually welcomed the prospect little more than
Konrad Adenauer did. And, use of force could likely be postponed indefinitely.86
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Before higher level discussions with the Soviets could resume, the Allies needed to
develop a joint approach. Dulles had to analyze what the Soviet actions were really about. His
first stop was London where he was surprised to find that Prime Minister Sir Harold Macmillan
and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd had a much “softer” attitude than the U.S. expected.87 While
the US had surprised the Allies in December with their flexibility, the U.S. was still not prepared
to recognize the GDR, especially since the Soviets were not going to recognize the FRG. While
still in London, Dulles also met with Norstad and raised the question of how garrisoning nuclear
weapons in Germany would affect understandings with other allies. Norstad noted that it was a
major step but also cautioned against putting the move up for approval with the other nations.
He also complained of delays in deployments. Undersecretary Livingston Merchant commented
that the “Rubicon with the Soviets will be crossed when the Soviets get atomic weapons”88 The
Soviets did not have to go far forward to do that.
At the next day’s round, Dulles stated that he was convinced that the Soviets did not want
to go war over Berlin. The Allies had to be careful not to back them into changing that position.
He also reiterated his opposition to any “thinning out” of forces without corresponding moves
from the opposition. But most significantly a diplomatic solution to the crisis began to surface
with discussion of a Foreign Ministers conference, possibly as early as May. Macmillan now
made public his intent to engage in his own personal shuttle diplomacy, including a trip to
Moscow. That prospect left both Dulles and Eisenhower aghast with disbelief.89
Fortunately, Dulles found French President Charles De Gaulle and Prime Minister Regis
Debre less shaky. Ever the effective diplomat, Dulles pleased DeGaulle with his reference to the
France’s role as a victorious occupying power in Berlin. He knew that DeGaulle resented the
erosion of tripartite prestige after French blunders in Suez and Indochina. It is interesting that
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Dulles also referred to a problem we now call the “leverage of the weak” when he says “we
could not permit…the vanquished to…rule the victors.”90 Meanwhile, though, Ambassador
Llewellyn Thompson cabled Dulles from Moscow to advise that raising the inspection problem
either tripartitely or unilaterally with the Soviets would be “disastrous.” He added that the
Soviets would back off if not pressed to avoid further harsh publicity 91 Further talks with the
French now went smoothly, emphasizing the economic cooperation between France and the FRG
as a natural basis for influence, without Dulles having to make unsupportable concessions to the
French.
Dulles’ next stop in Germany would be more troubling. Chancellor Adenauer frankly
described his apprehensions about Western unity and NATO’s will and ability to stand up to
Soviet backed aggression. He wanted specific commitments from Dulles. Dulles replied that in
the event of serious armed incursion, the West must be prepared to dispatch an armored division
to secure a land route to Berlin. He stated further that such a condition would equate to general
war situation where the allies must consider the use nuclear weaponry. Failure to appear capable
of such commitment would “invite defeat on a purely conventional battleground.”92 Adenauer
replied that he feared there was little public support for such scenarios. Dulles assured him that
there was indeed such public will in the United States. Dulles also contrasted the US position
with the softer British views and harder French view, and asked what the West German thoughts
were for a provisional resolution. Adenauer wanted the deadline postponed and NATO’s
planned mission extended.93
Explicitly committed to forceful resistance as Dulles was with Adenauer, he remained
non-confrontational with the Soviets. Dulles was serious in his commitment to Adenauer. But
his reassurances that the U.S. would not bargain its ally away were matched by his continuing

25

determination to avoid war. The inspection issue was then effectively sidelined for the time
being by the use of sealed supply trains instead of the more ostentatious convoys.94 Dulles
impressed Adenauer with his perseverance on West Germany’s behalf in the face of his obvious
physical pain.95 The Secretary then returned to Washington with some confidence that the
alliance had been effectively shored up. He was, however, soon back in the hospital, and Acting
Secretary Christian Herter began to assume full time responsibility for crisis management.

Compromises Emerge (March and early April 1959)
Dulles’ efforts for Allied unity were well received by Eisenhower, whereas Macmillan’s solo
diplomacy renewed concerns. Inter-zonal friction continued to simmer but involved no new
important disputes. The Soviets did reassert their “rights of inspection”, but conveyed this by
diplomatic messages, which the Americans countered by referring back to the original
occupation agreements.96 The British and French were willing to cede leadership on the issue to
the Americans. A possible additional option, a passive embargo dubbed a “pacific counterblockade” was presented to Herter but only limited actual contingency planning was initiated.97
Herter now had to consider just how onerous the agency principle might be in the case of
document stamping by GDR replacements at Soviet checkpoints. Herter, with State’s legal
counsel concurring, was unwilling to entertain full stamping authority. Since that would be de
facto recognition of GDR authority, such a possibility was being very quietly considered.98 There
was still a very good chance that the Soviets would make good on their ultimatum.
With Dulles incapacitated in the hospital, American military advocates for a more
forceful response saw an opportunity to make their case anew. On March 13, Herter and his staff
held a meeting on Berlin contingency planning with Secretary McElroy, his deputy Donald
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Quarles, General Nathan F. Twining, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, White House JCS
liaison, Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster ; and representatives of each service. The
military wanted to clarify reports they had gotten on a State Department meeting the day before.
They told Herter they were very concerned about plans for the cut-off point (May 27) and also
about his statement that in no circumstances should the US initiate general war. Herter explained
to the Chiefs’ satisfaction that the policy remained the same: to leave military options open but to
be resorted to only in the event of the situation deteriorating to point of no return.
However, signs of conflict soon appeared. McElroy and Twining belittled continuing
the limited-use of force policy as being of no deterrent value, with Twining even opining , “we
have the capability to lick the East Germans”. McElroy also was concerned about getting
ensnared in fighting satellites with the Soviet armed forces so close at hand. The JCS protested
laxity in preparedness in the US European and NATO allies’ forces. Twining presented a long
list of more forceful recommendations, including a large scale deployment of 7,000 troops to
Europe. McElroy overruled that idea which the President would veto as a waste of strength.
Macmillan’s pilgrimage to Moscow had also stirred up the JCS.99
Diplomatic and legal alternatives to military force had created their own difficulties.
Skeptical hopes for assistance from the UN in stamping cases were answered with plans to refer
cases to the International Court of Justice.100 While the stamping issue seems arcane in many
ways today, it was then crucial in cross-border transfers of any kind. A deadlock in stamping
would seal the borders. Such a standoff was potentially destabilizing enough to worry
everybody but Walter Ulbricht who was still hoping for escalation. The UN had been of only
peripheral assistance in resolving the crisis anyway. UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold’s
reluctance during the worst of the crisis to take sides cost the UN any role in negotiations or the
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Foreign Minister’s conference. The US mission in Berlin also had to contend with a protest from
the Soviets about armed “escorts” dispatched by the US Army to observe convoys.101
Negotiations with the Soviets towards the Foreign Minister’s Conference were fitful. The
Soviets preferred a specific German settlement conference and/or a summit meeting with the
United States
Macmillan was still worried, though for his own political reasons. He had taken Eden’s
seat after the failures of Suez and knew he could be just as vulnerable himself. However, he had
made good on his intent to visit Moscow. It was an uncomfortable visit. Khrushchev stood him
up so to entertain visiting Iraquis (who had recently overthrown a British-backed king in
Baghdad). He then taunted the Prime Minister at official dinners and generally subjected him to
a very public display of how far British foreign influence had diminished. Khrushchev did take
the opportunity to lift his May 28 deadline, though it is unlikely that that decision was hastened
by Macmillan’s visit. Still, Macmillan had mollified the Russian leader somewhat with praises
of Khrushchev’s war record as political commissar and supply expediter. Macmillan’s message
was sufficiently pious and benign to assure Khrushchev that Britain was no threat in this matter.
Macmillan, along with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and Ambassador Harold
Caccia briefed Herter in Washington within days. The Foreign Minister’s conference now
seemed a certainty, and on many points the British and the US attitudes were agreeable. Herter
and Eisenhower easily deflected Macmillan’s suggestion that the most effective course would be
to actually negotiate with Khrushchev, which was, of course, not on the US agenda at all.102
When Macmillan reported on what seemed to him certainly a great step forward, Eisenhower
congratulated him for his good intentions and determination. But when he visited the ailing John
Foster Dulles, the Prime Minister got a very undiplomatic appraisal of how dangerously naive
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such solo diplomacy might prove.103
In the wake of Macmillan’s visit, Herter received the first rumblings of the next
challenge. Polish and Czech envoys were demanding conference participation equal to Britain,
Germany, and France. Herter matter of factly expressed his doubts as to Soviet good faith and
the follies of dividing the world arbitrarily into “two hostile camps.”104 Then on March 30 in
Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko hand-delivered the Soviet endorsement of the East
European bids to Thompson at the US embassy in Moscow. The good news was that the Soviets
were officially acknowledging the imminence of the conference; the bad news was that the
Soviets were not letting the West off the hook as easily had been hoped. 105 The Soviets were
officially demanding full participation for the Poles and Czechs, and even made reference to
their status as victims of Hitler’s Germany, a neat reversal of the Allied invocation of World War
II era legal precedents. In fact, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson wrote candidly to
Undersecretary Livingston Merchant that the Soviets were no longer chiefly concerned with
German reunification, but might still be ready to harden their line across Europe and seek
negotiations on a broader level. Despite the recent gains, Thompson concluded that “the present
outlook seems to be a gloomy one.”106

Arranging and Conducting a Foreign Minister’s Conference (late April-May 1959)
Allied relations continued to improve in the weeks leading up to Foreign Minister’s
Conference. The April 18 quadripartite meeting was less tense than January’s sessions when
deep mistrusts existed among all four camps. 107 General Norstad suggested that the US lead
joint tripartite and NATO contingency planning dubbed “Live Oak,” with direct intermediary
command being delegated to British and French commanders. Live Oak planning would actually
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end up outlasting the May deadline as a new framework for ongoing Berlin contingency
planning. Simultaneously with Live Oak planning the President had directed State’s Policy
Planning Staff to prepare a set of non-force alternative options. These plans compared use-offorcer situations, i.e convoys, airlifts, naval actions, etc. with their probable outcomes, i.e. “free
world” reaction, “bloc” reaction, and general conclusions, which lead to escalation in every
situation.108
The briefing book prepared for the conference provides a good picture of the US agenda.
Primary goals included, “standing firm against pressure…stabilizing military
situation…effecting retraction of Soviet power…ascertaining Soviet intentions… furthering
substantive agreements…relaxation of intentions.”109 These are adaptive tactics, not proactive
initiatives. It is very significant however that the only topics listed for discussion concerned
Berlin and Germany. 110 The instructions to delegates are enumerated very specifically along
with specific references to limited and general war potentials,, as well as intelligence
opportunities, in their briefings. Acting Secretary Herter wrote Merchant, “we are concentrating
on the wrong danger, interference with allied access to Berlin …(instead of) East German
interference with West German access to Berlin.” Political squabbles on all sides were ignored
as much as possible. Difficulty in simply seating participants to general agreement was even one
more reason why the US team limited its response to diplomatic means. 111
Simultaneously in Geneva alongside the ministerial parleys, the US and Soviets also held
bilateral discussions and began to lay the framework for Khrushchev’s late 1959 visit to the
United States. These discussions were often tedious though. The tenacious Gromyko had a deft
touch for turning the tables on American strategy. When the Americans insisted on limiting
discussion to German issues, he replied by insisting that a German settlement was purely a
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matter for the Germans. An exasperated Herter asked what happened to other questions the
Soviets had said they wanted to discuss, like the growing nuclear stockpiles in Germany. But
Gromyko was too opaque for Herter to be able to engage more deeply. The Russians may have
wanted to ensure that these private bilateral talks could not substitute for a summit meting.112
Unfortunately, the architect of reason did not survive. John Foster Dulles died in
Washington and was buried with honors. All the Foreign Ministers attended his funeral in
Washington on May 28, one day past Khrushchev’s original deadline. Their comity on the
occasion was proof that, in this last assignment as both architect and instrument of U.S. foreign
policy, Dulles had pursued the most effective course to defuse tensions constructively.113

Prevailing Interpretations of Berlin II
At the time of the crisis, Berlin, the Cold War’s preeminent symbol, was still firmly, if
somewhat distantly, in the American and allied consciousness. The reasons were more symbolic
than practical. Berlin was still important for a number of reasons, relating to intelligence, EastWest trade, German pride and geography. It was a primary point of contact between East and
West.
Though largely ornamental as a theater of influence, Berlin was especially valuable as an
intelligence center for the America in Central Europe,114 Veteran intelligence operatives David
Murphy and Sergei Kondrashev argue that the Soviets actually ran a far more effective operation
there than the U.S. Unfortunately, it was also an unacceptable explicit place for Eastern
brainpower. General leakage of Communist assets to the west was one of Ulbricht’s most
persuasive complaints with Khrushchev.115 The flow of refugees was an uncomfortable
advertisement for the Western alternatives to socialism and this also may have motivated
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Khrushchev.116 But, in 1958-59, the value of German reunification and occupation to either the
Americans or Soviets was secondary to greater concerns about nuclear armaments and peripheral
situations. Influence in the peripheral areas of Asia, Africa and South America, where the
situations were less fixed than they were in Europe, demanded close attention as well.
As Mikoyan’s remarks to Dulles in January show, the Soviets by no means considered
Berlin as the only area of contention with the Americans. Yet historians usually see Berlin II
exclusively as a problem in German history rather than as simply another Cold War problem for
the United States. Germany’s primacy as political epicenter has, in fact been the main area of
research for historians like Marc Trachtenberg. He said that Khrushchev’s Berlin initiative “was
rooted in the USSR’s concern with Germany as a whole and above all with what was going on in
West Germany…” Moscow “wanted the former allies to keep West Germany from becoming
too powerful.”117 Despite trade advances and the successful re-equipping of its army, West
Germany was still the junior partner of the Allies, not significantly threatening to anyone.
Indeed, it was supported in great measure by the United States. Any challenge to revise the
Potsdam agreements would have at least as much to do with the United States as the West
Germans.
Given that Trachtenberg’s focus is the long term European settlement, his Germany-first
perspective is understandable. Regardless of whether or not Khrushchev’s primary concern was
Germany, the resolution of this challenge involved the disposition of the most powerful players
to use all military capabilities available in case diplomatic activities did not succeed. The mix of
these military and diplomatic options involved considerations of strength and lessons learned
extending far beyond Germany. Hope Harrison notes that while the United States had not
“confirmed the presence of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in the GDR in 1959, US
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suspicions were enough to deepen U.S. apprehension.”118 Even medium-range missiles,
however, invoked the possibility of either side ending up using intercontinental nuclear weapons
eventually. John Gaddis states that “NATO strategy had come to rely increasingly upon the first
use of nuclear weapons in the event of a war.” 119

If that was the case, then it may be

understandable why the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy kept NATO on the periphery of their
response.
Nevertheless, Berlin II is not generally considered as a textbook example of pragmatic
restraint where diplomatic resolution was emphasized. Authoritative modern historians such as
Marc Trachtenberg, Hope Harrison, Thomas Schwartz, and John Gaddis have generally viewed
the crisis as a primarily European problem, exacerbated by Dulles alleged penchant for
unnecessary brinksmanship.120 The question of whether the American strategy was a success or
failure of in terms of allied relations or resolution of the German problem may be irresolvable.121
The historiography is contradictory in evaluating what is usually considered as a marginal
interlude of Cold War Berlin’s history before the drama of the Wall’s construction.
But there are other perspectives than the prevailing German interpretations of Berlin II.
One is the crisis’ role in the developing rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao. Berlin II is also
an important event in the careers of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, French President
Charles DeGaulle, and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. These leaders all played
active, but not necessarily decisive, roles. The interpretations of their roles in Berlin present
their own challenges. For instance, Gordon Craig suggests that it was DeGaulle’s unwillingness
to compromise that preserved West German independence, of which Adenauer remained very
proud.122
These were all veteran leaders greatly familiar with war and the limits affecting the
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effective application of force. But perhaps most essential to the success of diplomatic process
over actual war were the formidable experience, talents, and inclinations of Eisenhower and
Dulles. Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s own strong disposition against needless war was
also a foundation of the eventual resolution of the crisis. Though projecting a more threatening
public image,123 he was relatively restrained in delivering his proposals. He also kept the Soviet
forces in Germany restrained, for the most part, during the crisis. Although he had a much
colder relationship with his diplomats –Taubman reports that Gromyko was terrified of
Khrushchev – they did function very efficiently on his behalf. 124
Eisenhower and Dulles were faced with further problems in using force with necessary
precision. Eisenhower was already dissatisfied with the Defense Department’s efficiency and
reliability and had ordered organizational review in June 1958.125 His frustration was increased
by disagreements among the allies over strategy and by pressures to increase military spending.
Competition between the Departments of Defense and State for influence both in Washington
and in the field, as well as inter-service conflicts within Defense compounded his frustration.
The ability to use military force effectively was essential because there was no guarantee that
negotiation would succeed or that the Soviets would not present new provocations. Effective
military capability had to be preserved and not squandered through ill-considered displays of
force. Eisenhower told a congressional group during this period: “the Communist objective is to
spend ourselves into bankruptcy.” He went on: “This is a continuous crisis: Iran, Indochina,
Formosa, Iraq.”126 Instead of airlifts or heavily armored convoys through East Germany, the
Allies needed to conserve their forces and show firmness through readiness and cohesion.
Achieving this proved almost as intimidating as the prospect of Warsaw Pact tanks rolling across
western plains.
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Eisenhower and Dulles had similar basic instincts about the extra-Eurocentric nature of
Khrushchev’s real intentions and their allies mediocre experiences in using force ineffectively.
Handling the allies was a delicate proposition even in before the state of alarm. Because
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s views were so congruent, the American President could send his
Secretary of State to Europe as his direct emissary to allied heads of state. The able cooperation
of the American diplomatic mission staff in Europe greatly facilitated Dulles’s efforts. Through
these experienced diplomatic channels, the United States successfully avoided a possible nuclear
conflict through an acceptable compromise. They conceded to being summoned to the table
under duress. This allowed the Soviets to present the East Germans as their partners at the same
table in Geneva as the western allies, without either side having to extend formal recognition. At
the same time, the US and its allies had outlasted Khrushchev’s original six-month deadline and
continue their presence in Berlin as before without any loss of military stature or position.
Berlin II may be most significant as a pivotal Cold War conflict resolution exercise for
the United States. Though ostensibly involving all four western powers, it was an essentially
bipolar conflict between the US and Soviets. It was the first major encounter between the
superpowers since Korea to carry the active potential of nuclear combat. The success of the
Eisenhower/Dulles “restraint with resolve” approach established a template of diplomatic
negotiation with the USSR as a course of first and determined resort. Disappointing results with
limited wars for both the US and its allies and for the Soviets may have prompted interest in
finding such a new approach to conflict resolution. Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy
emphasized flexibility and defense more than aggressive containment.127 His leadership style
also allowed him to benefit from the new policy planning ideas while managing to channel their
influence.128
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Khrushchev had similarly drawn down the Soviet Union’s armed forces yet was anxious
to be able to project Soviet military strength if desired. There were compelling economic,
political and strategic reasons for the Russian streamlining. But, as with the Americans, they
also created some concern over maintaining effective strength. Nuclear deterrence involved
considerably more risk than conventional forces but it also provided capabilities that seemed
essential for superpower strategy. The writings of private nuclear strategists like Henry
Kissinger, Edward Teller and Robert Osgood reflected the new rationales for risks of fallout and
mass casualties. 129 The nuclear capacity provided the diplomats with a big stick to carry, but the
uncomfortable reality for both sides was that any conventional action would be hard to sustain
and nuclear exchanges would negate the value of the territory. If diplomats could just invoke
the potential of nuclear weapons while trying to forestall the need for that recourse through
negotiation, many problems associated with limited wars could be avoided.
Growing distance between the United States’ diplomatic and military establishments in
the period leading up to the crisis also discouraged Eisenhower’s confidence in a military
solution. Furthermore, State officials were openly skeptical over military competence at even
minimal exercises of force. Rivalry between the armed services eroded Eisenhower’s confidence
even further.130 General Clay’s December convoy proposal and the March visit by the JCS to
Herter show that the Pentagon was favorably disposed toward armed conflict. But the President
saw war as an option of last resort. He was inclined to pursue negotiation instead.131 And
because his Secretary of State had increasingly similar instincts about Allied relations, the
German question, negotiations with the Soviets and the hazards of accidental war, Dulles and his
diplomatic team became the instrument of choice to resolve the problems at hand.
The lapsing of the May deadline without imminent forced reordering of Germany was
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due to the effective restraint of force by all sides, led by the United States example. The unique
capabilities and pragmatic attitudes of the US, Allied and Russian leaders and their diplomatic
staffs and their underlying common interests were essential to the successful policy of restraint.
Dulles was no longer the rigid policy hawk with little command experience he had been
when Eisenhower and Khrushchev had met in 1955.132 He was no longer the dour Puritan
attempting to keep Germany divided under the United States’ terms. Nor did he attempt to put
Europe under the US’s nuclear thumb with Eisenhower’s distracted approval. Such criticisms
might have accurately characterized Dulles earlier in the decade as biographer Richard GooldAdams has described.133 But Goold-Adams concludes that by 1959, “first and foremost, he was
from start to finish determined to prevent the use of force at almost any cost.” Thomas
Schwartz has pointed out the US had other problems to consider and could not undertake risk
casually.134 For example, in the midst of the crisis, on the first of January 1, 1959, suspected
Soviet sympathizer Fidel Castro overthrew Cuba’s U.S.-aligned government. 135 In the face of
budget constraints and potential hazards of localized/limited wars demanding the attention of
both Washington and Moscow, both countries found it incumbent to analyze militarization and
limited war issues. Khrushchev himself had to deal with resistance from the Soviet military
establishment when he attempted his own defense cutbacks in the latter 1950s. 136
The Cold War presented ample opportunities for limited wars, some perhaps more
welcome than others. As we compare Khrushchev’s course and the American response, it is
useful to consider that the doctrines of limited-war were first formulated to provide specific,
feasible and effective means to political ends. Henry Kissinger’s 1958 Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy expanded a paper he had written for the Council of Foreign Affairs, a body
influential both within and outside the public sector. 137
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This work was based theory not on

experience, beyond the fairly small-scale Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and the American
and Soviet nuclear testing. Yet it gained some credence because the rules of war had changed
greatly The 1957 Sputnik launch promised ICBM delivery within months, even though neither
sides missiles were quite reliable yet. The limited-war options Dulles and his staff were
reviewing had considered possibilities of combat success - with and without nuclear weapons apart from political sympathies. They attempted to weigh the advantages and problems for
success, but the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff remained only one subordinate
executive department, with limited influence.138 Their evaluations had to compete for attention
with press columnists, private strategists, and defense contractor lobbyists.
Eisenhower did not want to muzzle the militarists too tightly, lest they lose their spark or
seek new alliances. The atmosphere of militarization was fostered by the vigor of readiness but
was containable.139 The more militant of these “Cold Warriors” may have felt immune to
general war’s danger. They may have just learned to live in political denial, as the nuclear
strategists did increasingly after basic cost-loss arithmetic caught up with arguments for
acceptable use of nuclear deterrence. Anti-testing protest and disarmament rallies began to gain
popular support. The acceptability of massive destruction receded rapidly once nuclear arms
control talk began again with Khrushchev’s late 1959 visit to Washington. This was aided in
part by concerns over accidental use of nuclear weapons. At this point only a few leaders
perceived that the Sputnik launch of 1957 was ushering in a level of uncertainty over accidental
war. Within two years, nuclear accidents would become a favorite subject of popular terror.
Khrushchev would then use that terror and the inexperience of another president as an excuse to
engage in risky bluffing again over Berlin.
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Conclusion: Nuclear Diplomacy as the Only Expedient Option
Throughout Berlin II, the United States’ response was restrained but tough and open to
negotiation. The U.S. was prepared – over the objections of the West Germans and French - to
negotiate objectionable topics. They called the Russian hand by considering such unappealing
measures as an “agency principle.” This would allow East German document stamping and
even plebiscites on reunification. But the President and Dulles both recognized that no unilateral
reordering of the WWII jurisdiction arrangements could be tolerated.140 Their disciplined
strategy could forego some technicalities to avoid a destructive security and influence collapse
over a Berlin that was of little functional value. The essentially diplomatic nature of the 4-power
occupation agreement for Berlin - an agreement between states - also prompted a diplomatic
course. The American diplomacy was backed by readiness to use force if and when the
President deemed appropriate.141 The Soviets could not be sure how the Americans would
define these crucial variables.
The difficulty of conducting a limited war in Germany was a principle reason for
choosing diplomacy. The Soviets had a considerable advantage in conventional assets and close
proximity for supply and reinforcements that would be hard to quickly mobilize against.
NATO’s strategy for compensating for that advantage with tactical nuclear weapons presented
additional hazards of radiation and massive destruction, as well as the potential for triggering
escalation from local to general war. Limiting damage to civilians, essential infrastructure, and
economic assets would be a daunting constraint even with conventional weapons. The use of
nuclear weapons would be almost sure to spread the conflict beyond German borders.
Many of the East’s grievances over Berlin were still in place a few years later – the drain
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of human resources, the intelligence concerns, and the nuclear weapons close at hand.142 The
leading personalities of 1958 did not totally define the conflict over Berlin. It was
geographically susceptible to war, especially under poor or distracted management as Cold War
territories often were. One value in viewing Berlin II as a war problem is that in many ways it
really was just another ‘generic’ conflict. The same Middle East and Third World conflicts
Eisenhower had complained about to the Congressmen sprang up routinely in the Cold War only
to subsume again into hibernation for a few more years. Egypt, Iran and Iraq, the Chinese
offshore islands and Indochina were all arguably more unstable than Germany. China had
bombarded the contested territories of Quemoy and Matsu just weeks before Khrushchev’s
November speech.143 The loss of Berlin was simply not that much more dangerous in real, rather
than symbolic, terms than other geo-strategic concerns.
While long-term divided-nation wars, like the Vietnam war, may have been the more
common limited-war type, the limited-war perspective should also include the potential wars that
shared many of the dangers but which were solved without much military action. As the
influential theorist Robert Osgood himself observed in retrospect about Berlin II, “”The US
…rejected the resort to…nuclear weapons…even though the U.S. enjoyed a…superiority in
(these) weapons.”144 The limited-wars that could have been but were averted - like Berlin II were Cold War success stories even though those successes were themselves often limited. They
were never as costly, even in terms of prestige, as a war would have been. The diplomatic
course in Berlin may not have produced conclusive results but neither did it leave Germany
destroyed yet again. The proxy mode of conflict -- diplomatic exchange instead of military
action -- pioneered in Berlin II was a very risky but viable alternative to general war. The
example of Berlin II provides not only a useful set of options and also a set of typically
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damaging accidental situations, and gives some sense of how to maintain a “safe zone.” Close
attention to these events is intended to focus attention on how nations can preserve their peace
against unrewarding and irresolvable future conflicts.
The value of Berlin II as a template for the future challenges is underscored by comments
Paul H Nitze made in Milwaukee to the World Affairs Council in late February 1959. He
described dilemmas that would face the entire next generation of US presidents and their
advisors: “The process of action and reaction will test the resolution of both sides. It is
comparable to the process of peeling off the successive layers of two onions. At the center of
each onion is a kernel of self-knowledge that no stake, even the German stake, is worth a
nuclear war. Each side will try to peel…the other side’s onion of resolution, while trying to
protect its own. This is a dangerous game.”145 The 1958-59 Berlin crisis was the first
round with real nuclear war possibilities. It would not be the last.
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